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Abstract: After more than 35 years of economic reforms, China’s urbanization has been 
increased from 17.92% in 1978 to 51.27% in 2011. A large number of migrants have 
moved from rural areas to large metropolitan cities, especially cities on the East coast and 
Southeast coast of China such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, seeking employment 
and better lives. However, the massive increase in city size has brought many issues such 
as overpopulation, traffic congestion, and crime. It is commonly believed that the influx of 
rural migrants is associated with increased crime. However, very few comprehensive 
studies based on reliable crime records have been conducted in China. This paper 
investigates the available crime records in five districts of Shanghai between 2008 and 
2012. It focuses on China’s internal migration and associated crime rate using Shanghai 
as a case study. Analysis of China’s historical, economic, social, and cultural factors is 
presented to interpret the outcomes of this investigation. 
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Introduction 
China started economic reforms in 1978. The reforms introduced capitalist principles to a 
totally planned economy. The government initially decollectivised agriculture and opened 
up the country to foreign investment. It then followed by privatising and contracting out 
many state-owned industries and the lifting of price controls, protectionist policies, and 
regulations. At the start of the reforms, China’s urban population comprised 17.92% of 
the 962 million total mass on mainland China (Zhang & Song 2003, 388). The 
decollectivisation divided up the land that used to belong to the Peoples’ Communes and 
allowed peasants to have long term leases. As a result, agriculture production became 
much more efficient, flexible and freed up surplus labour in rural areas. At the same time 
the control of population movement was relaxed allowing rural population to move to 
cities. Together with the attraction of high incomes and modern lifestyle in the cities, 
over the last three and half decades hundreds of millions people from rural regions have 
migrated to urban areas. China’s urban population has increased from 17.92% in 1978 to 
51.27% in 2011 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012, 1.2).  
Major cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou on the east coast and south 
east coast, attract the majority of rural migrants. The city size has increased enormously. 
For example, in 2010 Shanghai had approximately nine million permanent residents who 
migrated from other parts of China (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics 2012). This massive 
increase in city size has brought many issues such as overpopulation, traffic congestion 
and crime.  
The elevated crime rate has been a pronounced problem in recent years in many parts 
of China. It has been recognized that modernisation is often associated with an increase 
in crime (Bennett 1991, sited in Liu 2005, 613). China is no exception. Liu’s (2005, 
624-26) research reported a faster increase in economically motivated crimes compared 
to violent crimes between 1978 and 2002. Liu’s 2006 research also indicated that larceny 
had the fastest growth rate in all crimes during the reform years in China. Reasons were 
attributed to mainly modernisation which involved profound social transition from a 
socialist command economy to a market economy. In this process, it is believed that the 
rural-urban migration, relevant social disorganisation and weakening of social control 
were the main explanations for the crime increases (Liu 2006, 124-25). 
In terms of the relationship between rural-urban migration and crime, many Chinese 
researchers believe rural migrants are the major source of crime. The rural migrants’ low 
education, high unemployment rate, lack of knowledge on law and regulations, identity 
confusion and weakening control mechanisms are generally blamed as the reasons for the 
increase in crime (Li 2012; Jiang 2002, 31-33). However, most papers published do not 
include any clear evidence on the higher crime rate committed supposedly by rural 
migrants and the types of crime. It is apparent there is a lack of research and data on 
crime patterns in relation to offender’s background. This may be attributed to a lack of 
transparency and the publication of outcomes in China’s justice system in the past, 
especially in relation to court cases and sentencing. As a result data analysis on crime and 
migration had not been possible. However, in recent years, there has been progress on 
transparency in China’s justice system. Shanghai and many metropolitan cities have now 
made crime records available online from 2012, at the same time uploading historical 
crime data (from 2004) case by case online. The publication of the crime data provide 
this research with an opportunity to bridge the gap identified above.    
Method 
To address the paucity of statistical research concerning domestic migration and crimes 
in the past, this research randomly selected 1000 convicted offenders from 5 districts , 
namely Chongming, Pudong, Putuo, Songjiang and Xuhui in Shanghai, 200 each year 
between 2008 and 2012. These offenders have been convicted by the respective district 
courts. During the data collection each offender’s available digital file from the website 
of the 5 district’s courts was researched. The research recorded each offender’s gender, 
origin, residential status, rural/urban backgrounds, employment status, education level 
and the nature of the offence - all coded by clustered identification numbers. In terms of 
the nature of the offence, there were 24 specific crimes. The 24 crimes were further 
categorized into four different groups, namely property crimes, violence crimes, property 
& violence crimes and others according to the criteria in the Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 1997, 64-233).  
This research focuses on migration and crime. Distinction between locals and migrants 
were made based on birth place, born in Shanghai (locals) or other places (migrants). Due 
to China’s many years of strict control by the household registration system (Huko), a 
clear distinction between locals and migrants can be easily identified. 
Further, offenders were also grouped into rural and non-rural categories, identified 
according to the household registration system (Huko). It is worth noting, in Shanghai 
region itself, there is also a distinction between rural and non-rural population. Those 
who live in the distant Shanghai suburbs are considered to be rural population according 
to the household registration system (Huko). The livelihood of those rural Shanghai 
people used to depend on agricultural activities.   
The data was analysed via crosstabulation using SPSS statistical program. Chi-Square 
Tests were conducted to identify significant differences amongst different categorical 
variables.  
Results and Discussion 
In the 1000 convicted offenders, 70.3% were migrants and 29.7% were locals, 91.2% 
were males and 8.8% were females. 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide the background statistics regarding the 1000 convicted 
offenders. It has been demonstrated that a much higher number of people from rural 
backgrounds were convicted than their urban (non-rural) counterparts. When comparing 
migration status, it would appear that the majority of the convicted offenders were 
migrants from rural areas. They are more likely to be unemployed. At the same time, 
their education levels are low, mainly at a primary or junior secondary school level. 
Table 1: Background Information of the 1000 Convicted Offenders 
 Rural Non-Rural Total 
N % N % N 
Locals 129 43.4 168 56.6 297 
Migrants 610 86.8 93 13.2 703 
Total 739/1000 261/1000 1000 
 
Table 2: Employment Background of the 1000 Convicted Offenders 
 Employed Unemployed Total 
N % N % N 
Locals 95 32 202 68 297 
Migrants 135 19.2 568 80.8 703 
Total 230/1000 770/1000 1000 
 
Table 3: Education Levels of the 1000 Convicted Offenders 
 Education 
Illiterate Primary Junior 
Secondary 
Senior 
Secondary 
TAFE Tertiary Postgraduate 
Locals 1.0% 10.1% 52.5% 15.5% 17.2% 3.0% 0.3% 
Migrants 3.3% 28.9% 52.6% 6.5% 7.1% 1.6 0 
Table 4 demonstrates the nature of the crimes the locals and migrants were convicted 
of and the percentage of crimes in relation to total crimes in its own migrant or local 
offenders’ population. It would appear that the locals were more likely to be convicted 
for white collar crimes such as fraud and embezzlement. They also have been convicted 
more for dangerous driving and drug trafficking, probably because the locals have the 
capital to do so. The migrants are more likely to be convicted for property crimes such as 
larceny and violent crimes such as robbery by force, provocation, affray and making 
commercial transaction by force.  
Table 4: Number and Nature of Convictions and Rates in Respective Local or Migrant 
Offender Populations 
Type of crime Locals (Total N = 297) Migrants (Total N = 703) 
N % N % 
Falsely making out special 
value added tax receipts 
11 3.7 38 5.4 
Fraud 47 15.8* 31 4.4* 
Unlawful profit-making 1 0.3 3 0.4 
Embezzlement 13 4.4* 11 1.6* 
Intellectual property tort 0 0 1 0.1 
Forging certificates 1 0.3 4 0.6 
Illegal business operations 2 0.7 1 0.1 
Operating illegal gambling 
dens 
3 1 13 1.8 
Larceny 64 21.5* 289 41.1* 
Dangerous driving 42 14.1* 38 5.4* 
Drug trafficking 57 19.2* 45 6.4* 
Intentionally causing injury 17 5.7 44 6.3 
Provocation 16 5.4* 55 7.8* 
Obstructing an officer in 
discharge of duties 
1 0.3 9 1.3 
Robbery (by force)  1 0.3* 38 5.4* 
Rape 3 1 8 1.1 
Spreading obscene objects 1 0.3 3 0.4 
Unlawful detention 2 0.7* 11 1.6* 
Intrusion 1 0.3 2 0.3 
Affray 1 0.3* 16 2.3* 
Organizing prostitution 10 3.4 17 2.4 
Seizing 3 1 10 1.4 
Making commercial  
transaction by force 
0 0* 15 2.1* 
Fabrication and deliberate 
dissemination of false 
terrorist information 
0 0 1 0.1 
Italic & * A significant difference demonstrated. 
When the convictions are further grouped by the type of the crime, e.g. property or 
violence or both, Table 5 provides further details. It would appear the majority of the 
local offender’s convictions were more property related crimes, namely falsely making 
out special value added tax receipts, fraud, unlawful profit-making, embezzlement, 
forging certificates, illegal business operations, operating illegal gambling dens, larceny, 
seizing, drug trafficking, organizing prostitution etc. In contrast, migrants had much 
higher rates in relation to violent crimes such as intentionally causing injury, provocation, 
obstructing an officer in discharge of duties, rape and affray, or as in combination of both 
property and violent crimes such as robbery by force and making commercial transaction 
by force.   
Table 5: Type of Convictions in Relation to Migrant and Local Offenders 
 Property 
Crime 
Violence Property & 
Violence 
Others Total No of 
Crimes 
N % N % N % N %  
Locals 213  71.7 38 12.8 1 0.3 45 15.2 297 
Migrants 477 67.9 132 18.8 38 5.4 56 8 703 
Total No 
of Crimes 
690 170 39 101 1000 
 
The results demonstrate that more than 70% of the offenders in five districts of Shanghai 
were immigrants mostly from rural areas from other parts of China. When considering 
the composition of Shanghai’s total population of 23 million permanent residents, the 
migrant population was 8.977 million (2010 census, Shanghai Bureau of Statistics 2012). 
This equates to 39% of the total Shanghai population. Clearly, convicted migrants (70.3%) 
are statistically over represented here. There is a significantly higher number of 
convictions in the migrant population compared to the locals. Migrants are less than 40 
percent of the population but represent more than 70% of the convictions in the five 
districts in Shanghai. To make sense of this result, some historical, socio economic and 
cultural factors need to be considered.   
Historically, China’s 1978 economic reforms have generated more economic freedom 
for rural and city people. The decollectivisation of rural farmland has generated surplus 
labour from rural China. Rural residents have continuously flooded into cities in the past 
three and half decades, especially into metropolitan cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and 
Guangzhou to make money. One of China’s three famous “divides” has been a divide 
between urban and rural areas. This divide is reflected in almost every corner of an 
individual’s life, including income, education, recreation, medical services and lifestyle 
etc. Instead of narrowing the gap, the 1978 economic reforms would appear to have 
further accelerated the divide. Although the reforms have relaxed control on Chinese 
people’s mobility and allowed “peasant workers” from rural areas to move to cities 
seeking work, in reality these peasant workers have been mainly doing the so called 
“three D jobs – dirty, dangerous and difficult” that are unwanted by city residents. Their 
salaries are generally low, earning less than half to a third of their city counterpart’s wage 
(Zhu 2002, 84). They have formed a new socio economic underclass and their lifestyles 
provide a huge contrast to that of city people. 
Economically, rural migrant workers have earned a better income than working on 
their farmlands. But their incomes have been low and have grown at a much slower pace 
over the last three and half decades when compared to their city counterparts. According 
to Guo (2011, 124-25) and Jiang (2002, 31-34) this situation has created a huge disparity 
between the peasant workers’ expectations and reality. When they were first lured to the 
city, they expected easy money and a higher living standard. Their families also expected 
these workers to send money home. In reality, their lack of skills and education resulted 
in this group being at the bottom of city society from a socio-economic perspective. The 
peasant workers generally live in very poor neighbourhoods, with appalling living 
conditions, eating low quality food and are deprived of positive leisure and recreation 
activities. They generally are attempting to save every yuan to send home to their rural 
villages. Past research has identified that 75.3% peasant workers sent money to their rural 
homes and more than 40% of the workers sent over 50% of their incomes (Zhu 2002, 84). 
Economic deprivation theory indicates that conflict arises when the person lacking 
the resources becomes aware and begins to experience feelings of envy and injustice 
(Stiles, Liu, & Kaplan 2000, 66-67). This research shows that 41.1% of the crimes 
committed by migrant workers in Shanghai are larceny related crimes mainly via stealing 
from other people or an organisation’s property. In addition, 80.8% of the crimes were 
committed by unemployed immigrants. It would appear that migrants’ economically 
deprived situation contributed to their convictions. Lack of money and livelihood is 
certainly a factor for increased property related criminal activities. Internationally, 
research evidence also connects immigration and crimes. It is generally considered that 
immigrant groups that have poor labour market opportunities tend to be more associated 
with property crime (Bell & Machin, 2011, 2). 
Socially it is evident that most migrants adapted poorly in cities (Zhu 2002, 83-87). 
The adjustment process for rural migrants is often painful and their communication skills 
are generally low. Their social interactions are mainly in their migrant circle. Like all 
migration phenomenon around the world, it is very difficult to break into the local middle 
class’s social circle (Zhu 2002, 87).  
In addition, the Chinese social and administration system further disadvantages the 
rural migrants. As previously noted one of China’s three great divides is the divide 
between city and rural areas. Historically a significant factor to this divide is the 
household registration system. All city people have been registered and managed by the 
relevant city governments. This administration system restricts people’s mobility and 
made it easy to control by the different levels of government. It is an integral component 
of a Communist government - having great control over its people. This administration 
system greatly favours city people as most services are concentrated in cities. The 
favoured treatments of city people on all fronts have been reinforced for over six decades 
by the Communist government. For example, during the Cultural Revolution between 
1966 and 1976, due to the shortage of food, grain, meat, cooking oil and other basic 
living essentials, Chinese people had rations. City people were provided with ration 
tickets based on their household registration. Without the registration, it was impossible 
to survive. City people, especially in large metropolitan cities, had higher rations than the 
people living in small cities and rural areas. 
Further, the household registration system is very rigid. It normally prevents rural 
migrants from obtaining city registration. Although people still move without household 
registration they have little right to city services. Citizens in big cities have much better 
access to education, medical and cultural services. The best schools, universities and 
hospitals are all located in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. As a result many 
city people have much better education and higher paid employment. These privileged 
treatments by the system have culturally nurtured a feeling of superiority on the part of 
city people. People from rural areas mostly have been perceived as backward looking, 
less educated, poor and dirty.  
The rural migrants suffer discrimination in the city and are often treated as second 
class citizens. Inequality is obvious. Research has indicated that less than 10% of rural 
migrants have access to social security, only 20% have medical insurance and pension for 
retirement (Li 2012). Their children have difficulties to access good local schools. 
Poverty and systemic discrimination have pushed peasant workers to city fringe ghetto 
areas. The peasant workers form an underclass in all Chinese cities. Feelings of 
marginalisation on the part of rural immigrants and their children is inevitable. 
In addition, it has been frequently reported that migrants’ rights are often breached, 
such as not getting paid on time. In this kind of situation, they have little knowledge as to 
how to assert their own rights and often don’t get enough support from government 
organisations and police. Corruption and unfair treatment cause resentment. Due to low 
levels of education, they have little idea about laws and regulations and have no money to 
access lawyers and relevant services. A lower level of control over their emotions was 
also identified (Wang 2002). As a result, some migrants take the law into their own hands. 
For example, when payment is long delayed, some migrants go to their employers to 
chase money using whatever means they can, including violence. This has been 
documented as “self-saving type crime” (Gu 2010, 126-28). The results of this research 
support the past findings via identifying a higher incidence and percentage of affray, 
provocation and making commercial transactions by force on the part of migrants 
compared to their local counterparts.  
Migrant social identity is another issue. The younger generation of migrants often 
have trouble to identify their belonging in a city. Based on Wang and Zhu’s (2012, 2-5) 
research it would appear that there is a new generation of immigrants from rural areas 
committing crimes. The parents of this generation are the first wave of rural migrants 
coming to work in big cities after the economic reforms. They have largely settled in 
lower socio economic urban areas via continuing their “three D” work. Most of their 
children have initially endured separation from their parents. Due to the difficult situation 
at the time it was generally the case that the children of the migrants were prevented from 
moving to the city. When the parents settled in the city, many of the second generation of 
rural migrants came to the city to reunite as a family and obtain some education. These 
young people feel superior to their rural counterparts, but inferior to their city friends. 
They have learned the city way of living, but without the financial means. Because of the 
social and economic disadvantage of their parents’ generation and prolonged separation, 
it affects the quality of their schooling, psychological development and self-esteem. As a 
result, according to Wang and Zhu (2012, 3-5) these young people are often emotionally 
unstable, psychologically unbalanced and achieve poorly in their academic studies which 
become important contributing factors to their high crime rate. Many rural migrants, both 
old and young generations, experience an identity crisis as they feel they don’t belong to 
either their rural village or the city (Zhu 2002, 87).  
The higher rates of violent crimes such as provocation, obstructing an officer in 
discharge of duties, robbery by force, affray and making commercial transaction by force 
committed on the part of migrants revealed in this research appear to be a consequence of 
this prolonged and cross-generational social and economic marginalisation. The evidence 
provided by this research that migrant offenders often have low education and a higher 
unemployment rate supports past research conducted by Wang and Zhu (2012, 3). In their 
research, crime offenders in Shanghai have the characteristics of “three lows” - low 
education, low employment rate and low/younger age. The higher unemployment rate 
may be a result of their low education levels which is one of the outcomes of the great 
divide between city and country areas. The younger age - identified from past research - 
could be attributed to the second generation of migrants who have partially grown up in 
the city, have not been well educated, suffer identity crises and have psychological and 
emotional development issues as outlined above. 
Historically at the end of 19th century, Europe experienced similar major economic 
and social changes accompanied by rapid industrialisation, urbanisation and increased 
crime. The dislocation of rural population caused the original externally constraining 
conscience collective to break down undermining the traditional social order and brought 
about anarchy and conflict. Durkheim called this ‘anomie’ (Johnson & Duberley 2010, 
565-566).  In the 21st century China is facing similar rapid economic and social change 
which makes Durkheim’s theory on anomie, social cohesion and crime all the more 
illuminating. For example, Durkheim believed that there was little to restrain the 
economically powerful from overwhelming the weaker (Johnson & Duberley 2010, 566). 
In Shanghai’s case this is illustrated by some of the economically powerful employers 
refusing to pay the weaker workers on time, which resulted in conflict and crime. Yet, 
today’s China is a very different society from that of the 19th century Europe. 
Confucianism and collectivism are deeply entrenched in Chinese society and cultural 
values. The government is promoting its Chinese style of social cohesion focusing on 
collective good, not a morality that was ‘freely’ willed and ‘freely’ accepted as Durkheim 
suggested (Durkheim 2002, 120). However, revisiting Durkheim’s literature would 
provide Chinese scholars, administrators and alike a new way of interpreting migrant 
crime issues in China and may indeed provide fresh consideration of approaches to deal 
with the problem.       
Conclusion    
This research selected five districts in Shanghai as a case study to investigate China’s 
domestic migration and crime issue. The research shows that migrants from rural areas 
have a significant higher level of crime conviction than their city counterparts. They are 
much more likely to be convicted for property related and violent crimes. Their higher 
rate of crime conviction could be attributed to poverty, low education and skills, lack of 
employment opportunities and discrimination, including by the system and city culture. 
The Chinese household registration system, together with the traditional great divide 
between city and rural areas, appears to have a negative impact on the economic and 
social wellbeing of migrants with a rural background. Considerable effort and a change in 
culture on the part of government leadership and city residents are required to improve 
the current situation.  
This research has investigated some background information on convicted migrants to 
identify some of the problems associated with their higher crime rates. Further in-depth 
research investigating individual cases is needed to more fully understand the range of 
issues faced by rural migrants.  
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